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ABSTRACT The emerging intelligent applications in Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS), such
as product inspection by deep-learning-based image recognition technology, are highly computation-
consuming. However, the smart devices without sufficient computing resources fail to handle this kind of
applications. Moreover, the Internet has very high latency compared with the local network which fails
to meet the requirements of time-sensitive tasks, therefore we can not offload these tasks over the cloud.
Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) brings the opportunities to offload the tasks of ICPS to the MEC servers
to satisfy strict latency requirements, as well as to meet the demand for security requirements. Considering
MEC servers owned by the third parties, resource allocation in MEC should be solved jointly with network
economics to maximize the utility of system. In this paper, we investigate the task offloading problem
under the access capability, latency and security constraints. Specifically, we present a novel Adaptive Task
Offloading (ATO) auction mechanism to determine which MEC server to offload with access capability
and security constraints, and how to schedule tasks with various deadline constraints, which incentives the
third party of MEC providers to share their computing resources with the maximum profit. According
to our theoretical analysis, the proposed auction mechanism has the properties of individual rationality,
computational efficiency and truthfulness. Extensive simulations have been conducted to evaluate the
performance of ATO auction and the experimental results show our method provides better solutions with
the classic greedy algorithms in terms of maximizing the utility of the MEC server.
INDEX TERMS ICPS, MEC, computation offloading, auction, deadline constraint.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems(CPS) is an emerging approach that
concentrates on the integration of computational functions,
such as data and information processing, with physical
devices [1]. Nowadays CPS are widely applied in the indus-
trial domain. The Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS)
as the key innovative actions, have been launched in vari-
ous programs all over the world, e.g. Initiative ‘‘Industrie
4.0’’ in German [2], ‘‘Smart Manufacturing’’ in USA [3],
‘‘Made in China 2025’’ [4], IVI (Industrial Value Chain
Initiative) in Japan [5], ‘‘Industrial National Plan 4.0’’ in
Italy [6], etc. CPS in industrial infrastructures requires
a high level of decision-making capabilities in terms of
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Muhammad Maaz Rehan .
‘‘autonomic’’ with self-decision processes and ‘‘collabora-
tive’’ with negotiation-based decision processes, which needs
the smart devices in ICPS to handle computational-intensive
tasks.
The skyrocketing applications of ICPS, such as product
inspection by deep-learning-based image recognition tech-
nology have placed severe demands on low-latency, high
reliability and stability [7]–[9], while cloud infrastructure
fails to meet the above demands due to the network uncer-
tainty. Moreover, the above demands also urge burdens
on communication and computation techniques of smart
devices, which becomes the obstacles in terms of data pro-
cessing, data latency and data access. These requirements
involve the need for highly localized services at the network
edge in local proximity to smart devices. In light of this,
theMobile Edge Computing (MEC) technology has emerged,
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with the goal of offloading the cloud services to the network
edge. In addition, MEC servers typically belong to different
authorities and are profit-driven. Hence, smart devices need
to take the offloading cost, such as the payment toMEC server
for offloading service, into account when they decide whether
to offload tasks or not.
FIGURE 1. One ICPS Scenario of ATO.
In this paper, we consider the general scenario of ICPS
deployed with multiple MEC servers in one smart factory,
as shown in Figure 1 where many assembly lines are on
operation at the same time. Smart devices (mobile robots,
Automatic Guided Vehicles-AGVs) equipped within each
assembly line generate multiple computation-sensitive tasks
with heterogenous constraints on their response time. In order
to offload the computation burden from the cloud to MEC
servers, the system needs the ability to deal with task offload-
ing scheduling, such that MEC servers can complete tasks
within diverse deadline constraints. Meanwhile, production
lines require that the inspection system can handle online
task flows. Furthermore, there exists the limitation of access
bandwidth for each MEC server, and it needs to be taken
into consideration when smart devices selectMEC servers for
computation offloading.
The current research on task offloading either ignores the
security requirement of offloading tasks [10]–[12], or fails to
give considerations to both the heterogeneity of deadlines and
the incentive of resource sharing for MEC servers [13]–[15].
The intelligent applications in ICPS have rigid diverse
requirements on task offloading, including security of ser-
vice, heterogeneity of demands and incentives of resource
provision. For instance, the industrial data usually have secu-
rity levels and offloading tasks have diverse constraints on
latency. In addition, the MEC server provided by the third
parties need sufficient motivations to share their computing
resource. Therefore, it is imperative to design a new incentive
mechanism for task offloading combined with security and
heterogeneity in ICPS.
In this paper, we will design a holistic solution for
joint computation offloading and resource allocation in the
multi-server MEC network, such that as many as tasks can be
offloaded to MEC servers and can obtain computation results
before their deadlines, in the meanwhile, MEC servers can
gain the approximate maximum profits. Specifically, we con-
sider a large ultra-dense network of ICPS where multiple
MEC servers provide computation offloading services for
smart devices. In order to make the inspection system of
ICPS satisfy the requirements of multiple productions and
assembly lines, there are some major challenges that need
to be addressed. First, the complexity of task offloading
decision-making should be handled to satisfy various dead-
line constraints. Second, how to incentive MEC servers to
share computation resource is critical for task offloading.
Third, account for various offloading amounts, the incentive
mechanism should adapt to the amount pattern of offloading
tasks. Last but not least, the scheduling methods should pro-
cess the online tasks for the real-time inspection system.
The main contributions are concluded as follows.
• In order to tackle the challenges of the complexity of
task offloading, incentive efficiency and the real-time
requirement for ICPS applications, we present a novel
Adaptive Task Offloading (ATO) auction mechanism for
online computation offloading with various deadlines
guaranteed, which can adapt to various task patterns in
edge computing.
• In order to meet the requirements of access capability
and security, ATO selects the MEC server for each user
bymatching of security levels ofMEC servers and users,
as well as access capability.
• Both theoretical analysis and numerical simulations
demonstrate that our proposed ATO auction mechanism
has three desirable properties: a) computational effi-
ciency, b) individual rationality, c) truthfulness, as well
as higher performance than other classic greedy algo-
rithms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
The related work is discussed in Section II. Section III
presents the overview of ATO framework and system model.
In Section IV, we present the design of the ATO auction
mechanism and prove its desirable properties. Our theoretical
analysis and numerical evaluations are depicted in Section V.
We conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The contribution of our work lies at the intersection of
three critical cutting-edge research topics. (1) Multiple MEC
servers selection; (2) Offloading scheduling; (3) Incentive
mechanisms for edge computing. Combining the above cases,
a fundamentally novel adaptive task offloading auctionmech-
anism is proposed for the ICPS system with multiple MEC
servers and multiple users.
A. MEC SERVERS SELECTION
Considering multiple heterogenous MEC servers are placed
on the factory area, current research focused on the selection
of multiple MEC servers based on their locations, or load
169056 VOLUME 7, 2019
S. Luo et al.: ATO Auction for ICPS in MEC
distribution or access capability, etc. Reference [11] selected
MEC servers based on the predicted cost with the prior
knowledge on load distribution of MEC servers, and made
load balance among different MEC servers. Reference [10]
exploited the k-means algorithm to make network partitions
of edge servers, then decided which edge server to choose
for task offloading. The authors of [16] tackled the edge
service placement problem with the limitation of constraint
budgets and transferred this problem to a novel combinato-
rial contextual bandit learning problem to select the optimal
limited number of edge sites. Reference [12] selected the
MEC server with more favorable uplink channel condition to
save transmission energy consumption, and allowed servers
to transfer tasks to neighboring servers to eliminate the bot-
tleneck caused by the limited resources on each MEC server.
However, the above MEC servers selection methods fail to
consider the security levels of MEC servers which is quite
critical for the industrial data.
B. OFFLOADING SCHEDULING
Task offloading is a fundamental solution to achieve low
latency, high bandwidth and stability for the mobile comput-
ing scenarios and adopted in two widely models, including
partial computation offloading [17]–[19] and binary offload-
ing, in which the tasks at each user are partitionable and non-
partitionable, respectively. Since the tasks in ICPS systems
are mostly with the atomic property, we focus on the binary
offloading model. Given the heterogeneous requirements of
offloaded tasks and limited capabilities of MEC servers, [14]
investigated the task offloading scheme and how to exe-
cute offloaded tasks. Reference [15] proposed a price-based
distributed method to schedule offloaded computation tasks
based on the Stackelberg game, which can obtain the equilib-
rium to make both users and MEC servers with maximized
utilities. Authors of [20] considered the communication cost
for data offloading, combined with the optimization of com-
putation resource. Taking the instability of downlink channels
into account, [21] presented a novel idea of computation
replication to accelerate the downloading speed. The authors
of [22] presented a multi-queue model to explore the impact
of offloading policies on the performance of IoT devices com-
bined with their assigned edge computing server. However,
previous work in this field neglects the heterogenous deadline
constraints on offloaded tasks, which needs to be carefully
considered in depth.
C. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR EDGE COMPUTING
The design of incentive mechanisms is given more atten-
tion in mobile edge computing, such as data offloading,
task offloading and caching. Reference [13] presented a
coalition game-based pricing scheme to offload data from
mobile devices to MEC servers. Reference [23] proposed a
new market-based framework for offloading heterogeneous
capacity-limited nodes to the network edge, and obtained
the equilibrium by two proposed distributed algorithms.
Reference [24] presented a novel model for allocating
computational resource in edge network by establishing
resource sharing contracts with edge infrastructure providers.
Meanwhile, the proposed schemes can complete tasks as
well as meet latency requirements. However, the current
work on incentive mechanisms for edge computing cannot be
applied for the ICPS task offloading scenario with multiple
heterogenous MEC servers and users.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we give an overview of the ATO, system
model for the task offloading in edge computing scenario and
formalize the offloading schedule problem.
A. FRAMEWORK
The ATO framework supports ICPS systems with heteroge-
neousMEC servers and multiple users (smart devices), which
can be applied to scenarios where IoT smart devices (such as
smart cameras, mobile robots and AGVs, etc.) need to offload
computation tasks to MEC servers. ATO consists of a set of
users (smart devices) and a set of MEC servers.
To solve the problem of high latency in cloud computing,
ATO offloads the computation tasks from smart devices to
MEC servers. Figure 1 illustrates one of the realistic scenarios
of using our ATO framework, i.e. the smart devices equipped
within the assemble lines in one factory want to offload
computation tasks to its neighboring MEC servers. The user
(one smart device) chooses which MEC server to offload
tasks based on the security levels and the access capability of
MEC servers. The MEC server decides how to schedule the
offloading tasks with various deadline constraints, such that
its utility is maximized. In the ATO auction, the MEC server
acts as the seller to share its computation resource and each
user plays the role of buyer who offers the monetary payment
to its offloaded MEC server.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
Users first generate a set of computation tasks, denoted as
T = {1, . . . , i, . . . ,N }, thus N is the total number of tasks
and |T | = M . User i generates one task ti and selects the
targeted server to offload ti from a set of MEC servers in the
neighborhood, symbolized as S = {1, . . . , j, . . . ,M}. Since
industrial applications have diverse security requirements,
user i has a security level li for its offloaded task, which
is only allowed to offload to the MEC servers with higher
security level Lj, where Lj ≥ li. Thus, according to diverse
demands on security, user i generates the list of authorized
MEC servers, denoted as Si, Si ∈ S and {Lj ≥ li|j ∈ Si}.
Next, based on location information of MEC servers, user i
selects the targeted server with maximum access capability
from Si for the stability of transmissions. After the period
of server selection, each user sends the offloading request to
its selected MEC server. Hence, each MEC server obtains
a set of task requests Tj, Tj ∈ T . The details of server
Selection Algorithm based on its Security levels and Access
capability (SASA) is described in section IV-A1.
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In addition, each user announces the amount-deadline-bid
triad (oi, di, bi) to its targeted MEC server, where oi is the
offloading amount, di is the deadline of task completion,
and bi is the highest price that user i is willing to pay when
the offloading task is accomplished. Based on the amount-
deadline-bid triad received from each user, MEC server j
selects a subset of task requests Toffloaded ∈ Tj to offload
and computes the payment pi for each user. How to select
the task requests, schedule these tasks with their deadline
constraints and determine the payment will be discussed
in Section IV.
Furthermore, it is assumed that each task can only be
offloaded to one selected MEC server and each MEC server
can operate only one task at the same time due to limited
computation resources. In addition, all task executions are
atomic operations, where tasks run completely independently
of any other processes. The computation resource of MEC
server is divided into different time slots with equal length,
which is determined by applications. For simplicity, we first
focus on the current time slot for the offloading schedule, then
we can easily expand it to the consequential time slots.
Table 1 lists the frequently used variables and their nota-
tions in this paper.
TABLE 1. Notation list.
C. UTILITY FUNCTIONS
Due to the diverse computation capability of heterogeneous
devices, the offloading benefit of each user depends on task
urgency. Hence, the user’s payoff is related to the saving time
by offloading. It is called users whose offloading requests are
accepted as winners. The utility of each winner is defined as
ui = α(oi/ci − di)− pi, (1)
where α is a factor to evaluate the benefit of the saving time
by offloading, ci is the user i’s computation capacity, and pi
is user i’s payment for offloading ti with pi ≤ bi.
The utility of MEC server j’s is defined as
ujs =
∑
i∈Toffloaded
pi, (2)
Since MEC servers belong to various providers, we con-
sider maximizing each MEC server’s utility rather than the
whole servers when MEC server decides the offloading
schedule and each winner’s payment with diverse deadline
constraint. Both the offloading schedule scheme and the
payment computation approach are assumed to be common
knowledge among users. Meanwhile, each selfish user will
exploit this knowledge to choose a bid to maximize its own
utility, which is shown in equation (1). We also assume that
users do not collude.
D. OFFLOADING SCHEDULE PROBLEM
Since MEC servers are provided by different third parties,
they need to obtain the profit as much as possible from a prac-
tical business perspective. In the meantime, MEC servers can
obtain the payment from users only when the offloaded tasks
are completed before their deadlines. Hence, the definition of
the Offloading Schedule problem is given in the following.
Definition 1: Offloading Schedule (OS) Problem: Given a
set of offloading requests Tj, one MEC server j decides the
offloading schedule, including which tasks to be offloaded,
how to schedule them with the goal of maximizing its
utility ujs?
It is easy to deduce that the utility of MEC server is
maximized when pi = bi. The OS problem can be formalized
as an optimization problem in the following.
Objective : Maximize ujs =
∑
i∈Toffloaded
bi,
s.t. ti ≤ di, (3)
where ti is the completion time of task i.
E. AUCTION METHOD
ATO adopts the forward auction which contains multiple
buyers and a single seller, where the buyers (smart devices)
send bids to compete for the offered computational resource
of MEC servers. The one who gives the highest bid will win
the competition.
FIGURE 2. The ATO framework.
We use Figure 2 to illustrate the auction process between
users and MEC servers.
• Server Selection:We present a server selection approach
to discover the targeted MEC server for task offloading
based on thematching of security levels and access capa-
bility of MEC servers, which makes sure the offloading
task with required security promise and transmission
stability.
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• Adaptive Offloading Schedule: According to users’
information of amount-deadline-bid triad, MEC server
decides which task requests to accept and how to sched-
ule these accepted tasks with various deadline con-
straints. Since users have selfishness, they intend to lie a
lower bid price for offloading service to obtain a higher
utility.
• Payment Determination: The pricing algorithm is pro-
posed to avoid users’ cheating behaviors. MEC server
computes the actual payment that each winner should
pay and returns the results of offloaded tasks to the
corresponding users.
In addition, we aim to design an incentive mechanism that
satisfies the following desirable properties.
• Computational Efficiency: the offloading schedule can
be computed in polynomial time.
• Individual Rationality (IR): each user will have a
non-negative utility.
• Incentive compatibility (IC): (also called truthfulness)
each user always prefers reporting his private informa-
tion truthfully to MEC servers rather than any potential
lie, i.e.; the user will get the maximum utility when it
reports its bid as its cost plus its basic revenue.
IV. MAIN DESIGN OF ATO
In this section, we describe the details of Adaptive Task
Offloading Auction that can be applied for ICPS.
A. ADAPTIVE TASK OFFLOADING AUCTION
The ATO auction mechanism is designed on the ground
of Myerson’s famous characterization [25], illustrated in
theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Based on the theorem in [26], an auction
mechanism is truthful if and only if:
1) The Offloading Scheduling (OS) algorithm is mono-
tone: If user i wins the auction by bidding bi, it also
wins by bidding b′i ≥ bi.
2) Given the OS algorithm, there is a unique truthful
mechanism associated with this scheduling algorithm.
Each user with offloaded tasks should pay MEC server
the critical value pi calculated by the corresponding
pricing algorithm: the lowest bid the user could claim
and still win when all other users’ bids are fixed,
i.e., task iwould not be offloaded if it bids a lower price
than this value.
Proof: The theorem in [26] is applied in the reverse
auction. In our forward auction, it has a similar property. For
the first condition, the bid price bi is the highest payment
that user i is willing to give if MEC server offloads its task.
Hence, if user i’ task can be offloaded with bi, it must also be
offloaded when user i is willing to give a higher payment b′i,
i.e., b′i ≥ bi. For the second condition, as the result of
Theorem 2.1 in [26], we can easily obtain that the payment
to each winner is inf{bi, i is the winner}, i.e., the tight lower
bound of bids that user i can claim and is still a winner. 
1) MEC SERVER SELECTION
In this section, we give the details of the MEC server Selec-
tion Algorithm (SASA) for each user by taking the Security
and Access constraints into consideration. First, each user
generates its authorized list of MEC servers, according to the
matching result of security levels. Next, each user selects the
targeted MEC server with a maximum achievable transmis-
sion rate. The SASA algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1MEC Server Selection Algorithm
Input: Security levels of MEC servers L, users security
levels l, locations of MEC servers and users.
Output: The selected MEC server S∗ for user i.
1: Initialization: Si = ∅
2: Authorized list Si = {j|Lj ≥ li}
3: S∗ = argmax{rij|j ∈ Si}
The propagation model of the indoor mobile wireless envi-
ronment [27] is used to evaluate the channel capacity. Accord-
ing to the Shannon-Hartley formula, themaximum achievable
rate from user i to MEC server j can be calculated by the
equation that
rij = Bj log2(1+
PL(dij)
nj
) (4)
where the path loss PL(dij) = PL(d0)+10φ log2(dij/d0)+Xσ
denotes the local average received signal power relative to
the transmit power, Bj is the bandwidth of MEC server j, nj
denotes the noise power at the MEC server j and φ is a
parameter to denote the power law relationship between dis-
tance and received power. PL(d0) is the path loss at a known
reference distance d0 and Xσ denotes a zero mean Gaussian
random variable that reflects the variation in average received
power that naturally occurs.
2) ADAPTIVE OFFLOADING SCHEDULE
In this part, we first present two simple greedy algorithms for
task offloading scheduling, then analyze the impact of task
patterns (defined in Def. 2) on their performance. In order to
match various task patterns, we design a novel adaptive task
offloading scheduling algorithm.
Theorem 2: The OS optimization problem is an NP-hard
problem.
Proof: We prove the NP-hardness of the OS optimiza-
tion problem by giving a polynomial time reduction to the
Knapsack problem, which is one of the classic NP-complete
problems.
Knapsack problem instance: There are n items with size
s1, s2,· · · , sn, value v1, v2, · · · , vn, capacity W and value V .
Question: Does there exist a subset S ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n} such
that
∑
i∈S si ≤ W and
∑
i∈S vi ≤ V ?
The mapping instance of the OS optimization problem is
established as follows. The bid of each task is mapping to the
value of each item, the offloading amount is mapping to the
size of each item, and the deadline of each task is mapping
to the capacity. Since the capacity is fixed in the Knapsack
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problem, we reduce the deadline of each task into the same
value. It is easy to get that the mapping process can be done
by taking O(n) time complexity.
Hence, it is obvious that q is a solution of one Knapsack
instance, if and only if it is a solution of the mapping one
of OS optimization problem. Moreover, the reduction from
Knapsack instance to OS instance is in polynomial time. 
As seen in Theorem 2 that the OS problem is NP-hard,
we design feasible greedy algorithms to solve this problem.
The naive scheduling scheme is to Schedule tasks based on
the Unit Price (SUP) or the Total Price (STP). The highlight
of SUP is that MEC server schedules tasks by the unit price
of each task, i.e., the bid value per time unit, which equals
to the bid divides the computation time. For STP algorithm,
the scheduling baseline is according to the total price, i.e., the
bid value of each task. In light of the computation consump-
tion, we divide all tasks into two classes, including 1) the
ones with the large offloading amount and 2) the ones with
the small offloading amount. In this paper, we use the ratio
of the number of tasks in the first class and the total tasks as
the metric γ to represent the task pattern, which is defined as
follows.
Definition 2: Task pattern is defined as the distribution of
the above two classes, which is explored from the historical
task requests within a learning window W , such as 100 time
slots.
FIGURE 3. The impact of task pattern.
In order to explore the impact of task patterns, we gen-
erate synthetic task flows with various task patterns.
Figure 3 demonstrates the performance of both simple greedy
schemes with different γ . We can see that SUP has bet-
ter performance than STP when tasks with large amount
dominate. Through this simulation result, we find that the
performances of both scheduling algorithms are significantly
influenced by task patterns. For the sake of matching various
task patterns, we therefore design an Adaptive Offloading
Scheduling (AOS) algorithm.
Based on simulation results in Figure 3, we observe
that when γ < 0.5, the performance of SUP is better
than STP, while γ > 0.5 makes the opposite. There-
fore, we set the threshold of task pattern is γ = 0.5.
Algorithm 2 Adaptive Offloading Schedule Algorithm
Input: Data offloading tasks M submitted by all users in
current time slot.
Output: Scheduling list of current time slot.
1: Initialization: Taccept = ∅,Treject = ∅, WL = M
2: γ=TPL(W )
3: if γ ≤ 0.5 then
4: Sorted T in decreasing order by (bi · cs)/oi→ Tsorted
5: else
6: Sorted T in decreasing order by bi→ Tsorted
7: end if
8: for ti in Tsorted do
9: Scheduling(ti)
10: if ti is accepted then
11: Taccept ← Taccept ∪ ti
12: else
13: Treject ← Treject ∪ ti
14: end if
15: end for
16: Delete tasks in Taccept from WL
In Algorithm 2, the current task pattern γ can be identi-
fied by the Task Pattern Learning (TPL) scheme with the
learning window W . If γ ≤ 0.5, MEC server adopts
SUP scheme and sorts tasks by (bi · cs)/oi in descend-
ing order, shown in Lines 3-4. Otherwise, MEC server
chooses STP scheme and sorts tasks by bi in descend-
ing order, shown in Lines 5-6. The scheduling function
in Line 8 is operated as follows. Above all, MEC server
should keep all executing tasks without interruption. Hence,
the deadline of the allocated task should change to the end-
ing time of execution tendi . Next, MEC server calculates
the computation time of task i, τi, and finds the idle time
period 1, satisfied min{di − 1iend |1i ≥ τi, di ≥ 1iend },
where1iend is the ending time of idle period1i. If there exists
such an idle period, task i can be offloaded, and joins the
accepted set Taccept , shown in Lines 9-10. Otherwise, task i
will be added to the rejected set, Treject , shown in Lines 11-12.
Finally, all accepted tasks will be deleted from the waiting
list WL .
Discussion: In the current time slot, the rejected users try
to send offloading request again with a reduced offloading
amount and its corresponding bid. In order to make sure that
the submission times bounded by mj, where mj is determined
by MEC server j, the offloading amount reduces oi/mj in
each time. The rejected users will keep trying to compete the
opportunity of offloading service by reducing the offloading
amount until any of the following three conditions is satisfied.
1) The offloading task is accepted. 2) The corresponding bid
becomes non-positive. 3) The current computation resource
is fully occupied before its deadline.
3) PAYMENT DETERMINATION
After tasks are scheduled by Algorithm 2, we design
a Payment Determination (PD) algorithm, summarized in
169060 VOLUME 7, 2019
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Algorithm 3 Payment Determination Algorithm
Input: Accepted offloading tasks in current time slot.
Output: Payment for each accepted task.
1: for ta in Taccept do
2: pa← ba
3: for ti in Tsort \ ta do
4: Scheduling(ti)
5: if ti in Treject and ti is accepted then
6: if γ ≤ 0.5 then
7: pa← bi · oa/oi
8: else
9: pa← bi
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
Algorithm 3, to encourage users to bid honestly, which
relies on Theorem 2. In Algorithm 3, the outside for-loop
(Lines 1-9) is to calculate the critical bid for each user whose
task ta ∈ Taccept . Each inside for-loop (Lines 3-9) aims to
obtain user i’s lowest bid whose task can still be allocated
in this iteration. Tasks are first scheduled from Tsort \ ta that
is the set of sorted tasks without task ta. If the scheduling
function can find the first task ti which can not be allocated
with waiting list of Tsort , while accepted with waiting list of
Tsort \ ta, the lowest bid is bi · ci · oa/oi when the adopted
scheduling algorithm is SUP, shown in Line 7. In the other
case that the adopted scheduling algorithm is STP, the lowest
bid is the bid of user i, bi. If it fails to find such ti, the lowest
bid is still itself, ba. After the above pricing, the mechanism
can promise that each user will bid honestly.
4) A WALK-THROUGH EXAMPLE
We use the example in Figure 4 to illustrate how the ATO
auction mechanism works.
FIGURE 4. Illustration for the ATO auction.
We set the offloading request of user i to be reqi =
[oi, di, bi, i], where i is the user i’s ID, and each scheduled
task is described as schei = [tstarti , tendi , di, bi, i]. Each user’s
truthful bid bi is set as the difference between the benefit
ei earned from the time saved by offloading and the basic
revenue δi ≥ 0, i.e.
ei = α · (oi/ci − di) (5)
bi = ei − δi (6)
We obtain the metric γ by TPL scheme and assume
γ ≤ 0.5 in this example. Hence, we adopt SUP algorithm for
the offloading schedule.
Offloading Schedule:
• Taccept = ∅,Treject = ∅, WL = {req1, req2, req3, req4}.
• e1 = 180, e2 = 540, e3 = 950, e4 = 110, set k =
1, δi = 10 for simple calculation.
• req1 = [1000, 20, 170, 1], req2 = [3000, 60, 530, 2],
req3 = [1000, 50, 940, 3], req4 = [1000, 50, 100, 4].
The computing ability of current MEC server is 100 per
time slot. The unit price of each request is p¯i = bi/(oi/cs),
thus we can obtain p¯1 = 17, p¯2 = 17.64, p¯3 = 94, p¯4 = 10.
• Tsort = {req3, req2, req1, req4}.
• For req3, SL = {[40, 50, 50, 940, 3]},Taccept = {req3}.
• For req2, SL={[10,40,40,530,2], [40,50,50,940,3]},
Taccept = {req3, req2}.
• For req1, SL = {[0, 10, 20, 170, 1], [10, 40, 40, 530, 2]
[40, 50, 50, 940, 3]},Taccept = {req3, req2, req1}.
• For req4, Treject = {req4}.
The above schedule list is illustrated in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5. Illustration for Offloading Schedule.
Payment Determination:
• p3: Tsort \ t3 = {req2, req1, req4}. For req2, SL =
{[30, 60, 60, 530, 2]},Taccept = {req2}. For req1, SL =
{[10, 20, 20, 170, 1], [30, 60, 60, 530, 2]},Taccept =
{req2, req1}. For req4, SL = {[10, 20, 20, 170, 1],
[20, 30, 50, 100, 4][30, 60, 60, 530, 2]},Taccept =
{req2, req1, req4}.
req4 ∈ Treject in offloading schedule process is allocated in
this iteration, p3 = 100/1000 · 1000 = 100.
• p2: Tsort \ t2 = {req3, req1, req4}. For req3, SL =
{[40, 50, 50, 940, 3]},Taccept = {req3}. For req1, SL =
{[10, 20, 20, 170, 1], [40, 50, 50, 940, 3]},Taccept =
{req3, req1}. For req4, SL = {[10, 20, 20, 170, 1],
[30, 40, 50, 100, 4], [40, 50, 50, 940, 3]},Taccept =
{req3, req1, req4}.
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req4 ∈ Treject in offloading schedule process is allocated in
this iteration, p2 = 100/1000 · 3000 = 300.
• p1: Tsort \ t1 = {req3, req2, req4}. For req3, SL =
{[40, 50, 50, 940, 3]},Taccept = {req3}. For req2, SL =
{[10, 40, 60, 530, 2], [40, 50, 50, 940, 3]},Taccept =
{req3, req2}. For req4, SL = {[0, 10, 40, 100, 4],
[10, 40, 60, 530, 2], [40, 50, 50, 940, 3]},Taccept =
{req3, req2, req4}.
req4 ∈ Treject in offloading schedule process is allocated in
this iteration, p3 = 100/1000 · 1000 = 100.
B. THEOCRATICAL ANALYSIS OF ATO AUCTION
In this section, we will demonstrate that our proposed incen-
tive mechanism of ATO auction achieves the desired three
properties: computational efficiency, individual rationality
and truthfulness.
1) COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY
Lemma 1: ATO Auction is computationally efficient.
Proof: We first analyze the computational complexity
of the AOS algorithm. Set n = |T |, T is the set of tasks in
waiting list in the current time slot. The time complexity of
sorting T in descending order of unit price or total price in
Line 3 or 5 is O(nlogn). The for-loop is at most n. Set the
number of tasks in the current scheduling list to bem, and the
idle periods in scheduling function are at most m + 1. Thus,
the for-loop of Line 6-11 costs O(mn). Hence, the offloading
schedule algorithm runs in O(mn) time.
After tasks are scheduled following the schedule list,
we compute the running time of PD algorithm. In each
iteration of offloading schedule in the set of Tsort without
the task under pricing (Lines 3-4), the process is similar
to algorithm 2 (Lines 6-7). Thus, the time complexity of
finding the first task in Treject to replace the task under pricing
is O(mn). Moreover, the number of outside for-loop is at
most m, since each for-loop completes the pricing process
for eachxxxs accepted task. Therefore, the payment determi-
nation algorithm takes O(m2n), which dominates the whole
ATO auction. It is obtained that the running time of ATO
auction mechanism is bounded by O(m2n). 
2) INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
Lemma 2: ATO auction is individually rational.
Proof: In the AOS algorithm, Line 8 of Algorithm 2
aims to allocate tasks by the decreasing order of unit price or
total price, while Line 4 of algorithm 3 tries to allocate the
task exclusive of ta. Set ti is the first allocated task among
Tsort \ ta which is in Treject set when algorithm 2 is executed.
When the offloading schedule adopts SUP, if and only if
(ba · ca)/oa ≥ (bi · ci)/oi is satisfied, ta can be allocated
in offloading schedule period. Since ti is sorted behind ta in
offloading schedule process, it is obtained that the payment pa
of task ta:
pa = bi · oaoi ≤ ba. (7)
Since ba = ea−δ and δ ≥ 0, it can be easily obtained ba ≤ ea.
Combine with equation (7), we can get pa ≤ ba ≤ ea.
According to the definition of user’ utility, it is deduced that
ua = ea − pa ≥ 0.
On the other hand, when the offloading schedule adopts
STP, if and only if ba ≥ bi is satisfied, ta can be allocated
in offloading schedule period. For a similar reason, we can
obtain pa = bi ≤ ba and ua ≥ 0. Hence, ATO auction can
guarantee that all users’ utility is non-negative. 
3) TRUTHFULNESS
Lemma 3: ATO auction is truthfulness.
Proof: As long as both conditions in Theorem 2 can be
satisfied, it can guarantee that ATO auction makes each user
truth-telling as a weakly dominant strategy to report his/her
bid honestly. For the first condition, the monotonicity of the
OS algorithm is easy to prove. On the one hand, when OS
algorithm adopts STP, if user i bids a bigger value, i.e., b′i ≥ bi
and the corresponding task named t ′i , t ′i will be sorted ahead
of task ti. Thus, if ti can be offloaded, then t ′i can also be
offloaded. On the other hand, whenOS algorithm adopts SUP,
if b′i ≥ bi, then b′i ·cs/oi ≥ bi ·cs/oi, t ′i will be sorted ahead of
task ti. Therefore, in both cases, the first condition is satisfied
in OS algorithm.
For the second condition, we should demonstrate that pi
is the critical value for ti, i.e. bidding lower pi could pre-
vent ti being allocated otherwise timust be allocated. Suppose
that ti is accepted in this iteration. In the case of STP, pi = bj,
where tj is the first allocated task in T \ ti and tj ∈ Treject
in the OS period, hence ti and tj must have collisions in the
offloading scheduling. If user i’s bidding bi < pi, then bi < bj
and task i will be sorted following tj. Therefore, when tj is
accepted, ti can not be allocated. For a similar reason, in the
case of SUP, pi = bj · oi/oj. If bi < pi, then bi/oi < bj/oj.
Thus, ti will be sorted following tj and when tj is accepted, ti
can not be allocated.
In short, the ATO auction can satisfy both conditions listed
in Theorem 2. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of ATO auction mechanism,
we do extensive simulations to evaluate the impact of main
parameters. The performance metrics are demonstrated as
follows.
1) Social benefit (B): The total benefit of eachMEC server
earned. In the offloading schedule period, it aims to
schedule tasks to make MEC server’s utility maxi-
mized. Note that the social benefit is the total payment
of offloaded users by a non-truthful mechanism.
2) Frugality ratio: It is computed as ρ = B−PB , where P
denotes the total payment by our truthful mechanism.
Hence, the frugality ratio characterizes the cost that the
server makes each user insisting on the truthfulness.
3) Utility of all offloaded users: We record the utility of
offloaded users to verify the property of Individual
Rationality.
4) Execution time: The execution time of ATO auction
is the time to schedule offloading tasks plus the time
169062 VOLUME 7, 2019
S. Luo et al.: ATO Auction for ICPS in MEC
consumed on payment determination, which represents
the computational efficiency of mechanisms.
5) Approximation ratio: This metric mainly shows the
performance of AOS algorithm. It illustrates how both
greedy offloading schedule algorithms approach to the
optimal solution (symboled as OPT), respectively.
A. SIMULATION SETUP
In our evaluation study, we consider a network composed of
several MEC servers, each of which has a computation capac-
ity of cs = 100 computation amount per second. Besides
the setting in the evaluation of the frugality ratio, the basic
revenue of each user δi is randomly generated. All simulations
are ran on a PC with 2.6GHZ CPU and 8GB memory. Each
simulation is repeated 100 times, and the average values are
reported as statistical results.
B. EVALUATION OF OFFLOADING SCHEDULE
ALGORITHMS
We first evaluate the performance of ATO incentive mech-
anism with both current classic methods, random and FIFO
(First In First Out). In the random scheme, the MEC server
schedules tasks randomly, while in FIFO approach, the MEC
server schedules tasks according to its request time, i.e., the
first arrived task will be firstly scheduled. The user’s compu-
tation capacity ci and computation amount of each task are
uniformly distributed over [1,3] and [1000, 5000], respec-
tively. Since the access capacity of each MEC server is
limited, the number of users N increases from 10 to 20 by
a step of 2. Due to the heterogenous latency requirements,
the duration from the current time to the deadline of each task
is set to be η times of its computation time by MEC servers,
where η is uniformly distributed among [1, 30].
FIGURE 6. The comparison of MEC server’s utility.
Figure 6 shows MEC server’s utility of ATO auction is
always better than both classic schemes under the various
numbers of users. Meanwhile, we can observe from Figure 6
that the utility of MEC server increases along with the rising
number of users. This is due to the fact that the ATO auction
provides better solutions than the other two because of its task
pattern adaption.
C. EVALUATION OF APPROXIMATION RATIO
We evaluate the performance of the OS algorithm of ATO
incentive mechanism. Since the OS problem is NP-hard, it is
time-consuming to obtain the optimal solution with the gen-
eral approach, i.e. brute force search. Hence, the approximate
ratio of OS algorithm is only evaluated in settings with a small
scale, since the MEC server has limited access capability.
Specifically, the number of users is set within [4, 8]. The
user’s computation capacity ci and computation amount of
each task are uniformly distributed over [1, 10] and [1000,
5000], respectively. Moreover, η is uniformly distributed
among [1, 10].
FIGURE 7. Approximate ratio in small scale.
Figure 7 shows the approximate ratio with the increasing
number of users. It is clear that the social benefit of ATO
mechanism is quite close to its corresponding optimal solu-
tions. With the enlarge scale of users, the social benefit has a
rising trend. The reason for that result is that the augment of
users makes the server have better choices.
D. EVALUATION OF FRUGALITY RATIO
We investigate the impact of the frequency of bids fluctua-
tion on the frugality ratio. The bid of each user is assumed
to follow the standard normal distribution with the mean
µ = 10000 and the standard deviation σ is uniformly
distributed among [1000, 9000]. The number of users and
computation amount of each task are uniformly distributed
over [1, 10] and [1000, 2000], respectively. In addition, η is
uniformly distributed among [1, 3].
As shown in Figure 8, the frugality ratio increases with
the expanded standard deviation of bids. The reason is that
the price difference, of the task with maximum total price or
unit price and the one with the absence of the selected task,
is enlarged with the expanding fluctuation of users’ bids.
E. EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
In order to show all users have non-negative utility, we depict
the empirical CDF (Cumulative Distribution Function) of the
utility for all users under various settings. Particularly, the
computation amount of each task and η are uniformly
distributed over [1000, 5000] and [1, 30], respectively.
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FIGURE 8. Impact on frugality ratio.
For easy computation, the basic revenue of each user is fixed
as 10. The number of users is selected as three cases from
25 to 40. In addition, the user’s computation capacity ci is
selected uniformly among [1, 3]. From Figure 9, it is observed
that the proportion of users with negative utility is zero.
When the utility is zero, the value of CDF represents the
proportion of unaccepted tasks. All users have non-negative
utility, and the ATO auction mechanism achieves the property
of individual rationality (see § III-E).
FIGURE 9. Empirical CDF of users’ utility.
F. EVALUATION OF COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY
In order to demonstrate the computational efficiency of the
proposed ATO mechanism, we compare the execution time
of ATO with the other classic schemes, i.e., random and
FIFO. To explore the impact of execution time on the number
of users, the number of users is set to be uniformly dis-
tributed in the range of [0, 1000]. For the sake of more time
resource to schedule, η is set as the random value in [1, 100].
Besides, the user’s computation capacity ci and computation
amount of each task are uniformly distributed over [1, 10] and
[1000, 5000], respectively.
Figure 10 demonstrates that the ATO auction mecha-
nism has an inferior computational efficiency than the other
schemes, but it is still in the feasible range even if the number
FIGURE 10. Evaluation of execution time.
of users increases to a large scale of 1000. Therefore, ATO
auction mechanism satisfies the application requirements and
has high computational efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate how to incentive MEC server
with limited access and computation capability to offload
tasks efficiently for the QoS requirements on task latency
and security of intelligent ICPS applications. Specifically,
on the one hand, we present a MEC server selection method
under the access capability and security constraint for each
user. On the other hand, an Adaptive Task Offloading (ATO)
auction is presented to determine task schedules and the
payment for each allocated task with deadline constraint,
which has the ability to match various task patterns in ICPS
applications. In addition, we propose a task pattern learning
scheme to identify the current task pattern taking advantage
of the historical information. Through theoretical analysis,
we demonstrate that the proposed auction mechanism sat-
isfies the properties of computational efficiency, individual
rationality and truthfulness. Moreover, extensive simulations
have been conducted to evaluate the performance of ATO
auction has better superiority and efficiency than both classic
greedy algorithms.
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